The clean development mechanism (CDM) : an early history of unanticipated outcomes /
Ariel Dinar, Donald F. Larson, Shaikh M. Rahman.
Bok Engelsk 2013 Ariel. Dinar,· Electronic books.
| Utgitt | [Hackensack] N.J. : : World Scientific, , c2013.
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| Omfang | 1 online resource (321 p.)
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| Opplysninger | Description based upon print version of record.. - CONTENTS; Acknowledgments; About the Authors; Chapter 1. Clean Development Mechanism: Past, Present, and Future; ABOUT THIS BOOK; BOOK OUTLINE; BOOK CHAPTERS; An Updated Review of Carbon Markets, Institutions, Policies, and Research; The Activities Implemented Jointly Pilots: A Foundation for Clean Development Mechanism?; Cost of Mitigation under the Clean Development Mechanism; Diffusion of Kyoto's Clean Development Mechanism; Why Adoption of the Clean Development Mechanism Di.ers Across Countries?; Clean Development Mechanism as a Cooperation Mechanism. - DATA DESCRIPTION. - DOMESTIC POLICIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE US, AND AUSTRALIAEU Emissions Trading Scheme; Integration with the Climate Change Framework; Regional Initiatives and Voluntary Markets; Oregon; California62; Northeastern US; Chicago Climate Exchange; Australia; CARBON MARKETS64; Model Studies of Potential Size of the Market for the Flexibility Mechanisms; The Evolution of Carbon Project Financing; Evaluations of mitigation potential and project investment; The Geographic Distribution of Kyoto-Project Credits; Balance across asset classes; Who is buying project credits?. - Markets and the pricing of project creditsCONCLUSIONS AND AREAS FOR FUTURE STUDY; REFERENCES; ANNEX 2.1: Glossary of Acronyms.; Chapter 3. The Activities Implemented Jointly Pilots: A Foundation for Clean Development Mechanism? With Contributions by Gunnar Breustedt; ORIGINS OF THE AIJ PROGRAM; RELATED STUDIES; Numeric Studies; Investment and Agency Approval; Multilateral and Bilateral Transaction Costs; A MODEL OF PROJECT INVESTMENT; Conceptual Model; Applied Model; An Alternative Dichotomous Model; Internalized Agency Preferences and Transaction Costs; Additional Estimation Concerns. - Supplementarity, Additionality, Diversion, and Carry OverSupplementarity; Additionality and baselines; Managing tradable units inventories under Kyoto; Compatibility with the Trade Agreements40; EXPECTED OUTCOMES FROM THE CLIMATE CHANGE FRAMEWORK; Policy Evaluations and Predictions; Model Structures and Technology; Market Power; Leakages, Ancillary Bene.ts, and Crowding Out; Uncertainty, Discounting, and Intergenerational Tradeoffs; Technology Development and Transfer as a Policy Instrument; Technology transfer and project financing. - Why So Few Agricultural Projects in the Clean Development Mechanism?CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS; EPILOGUE; REFERENCES; Chapter 2. An Updated Review of Carbon Markets, Institutions, Policies, and Research With Contributions by Philippe Ambrosi and Rebecca Entler; SCIENCE AND POLICY; FEATURES OF THE CLIMATE CHANGE FRAMEWORK; Obligations Under the Framework; Flexibility Mechanisms; Emission Allocations and the Choice of Policy Instruments; Permit systems versus carbon taxes; Current Instruments; Project Rules; The CDM Project Cycle; The JI Project Cycle; Land Management Projects. - Following the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, countries took up the difficult task of finding a common approach that would slow down the build-up of greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere and delay changes to the planet's climate. A widespread concern among many of the participants in the newly formed United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was that the emission reductions needed to significantly affect climate change would cost so much that it could jeopardize the chances of a coordinated international solution. To address this concern, several flexible mechanisms we
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| ISBN | 1-299-46231-6. - 981-4401-10-2
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