A great deal of ruin : financial crises since 1929 /


James Gerber.
Bok Engelsk 2019 · Electronic books.
Omfang
1 online resource (xiii, 335 pages) : : digital, PDF file(s).
Utgave
1st ed.
Opplysninger
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 09 Aug 2019).. - Cover -- Half-title page -- Title page -- Copyright page -- Contents -- List of Tables -- Preface -- I Introduction -- I.1 More Frequent, More Expensive, Harder to Avoid -- I.2 Economics, Finance, and History -- I.3 Plan of the Book -- Part I Financial Crises -- 1 Categories and Risk Factors -- 1.1 An Introduction to Financial Crises -- 1.2 Categories of Financial Crises -- 1.3 Seven Risk Factors -- 1.3.1 Asset Bubbles -- 1.3.2 Credit Booms -- 1.3.3 Weak Supervision and Regulation -- 1.3.4 Capital Market Liberalization -- 1.3.5 Overvalued Currencies -- 1.3.6 Large Trade Deficits -- 1.3.7 Excessive Debt Levels -- 1.4 What Do We Really Know? -- 2 Growth, Globalization, and Financial Crises -- 2.1 Modern Economic Growth -- 2.2 Modern Globalization's First Wave: 1914-1950 -- 2.2.1 Open Capital Markets -- 2.2.2 The Gold Standard -- 2.2.3 Financial Crises -- 2.3 Interwar Instability, 1914-1950 -- 2.3.1 Deflation -- 2.3.2 Gold and the Great Depression -- 2.4 Bretton Woods and the Golden Age, 1950-1973 -- 2.4.1 The Bretton Woods Exchange Rate System -- 2.4.2 The End of Bretton Woods -- 2.5 The Second Globalization Wave, 1973 to the Present -- 2.5.1 Factors Behind the Increase in Financial Crises -- 2.6 Conclusion -- Part II Five Case Studies -- 3 The Great Depression, 1929-1939 -- 3.1 Why Study the Great Depression? -- 3.2 Factors Leading Up to the Depression -- 3.3 What Caused the Great Depression? -- 3.4 The Keynesian Idea -- 3.5 The Monetarist Response -- 3.6 Two Complications to the Monetarist Story -- 3.7 Economic Recovery and Relapse -- 3.8 Conclusions -- 4 The Latin American Debt Crisis, 1982-1989 -- 4.1 Conditions Leading Up to the Crisis -- 4.2 The IMF's First Global Crisis -- 4.3 The Credit Boom -- 4.4 Varieties of Crises -- 4.5 The Search for Solutions -- 4.6 The Return of Capital Flows -- 4.7 Lessons -- 4.8 From Latin America to East Asia.. - 13.5 Missing Institutions -- 14 Open Capital Markets Can Be Dangerous -- 14.1 Assume There Are Benefits -- 14.2 Capital Market Liberalization Defined -- 14.3 From Open Capital Markets to a Financial Crisis -- 14.4 Open Capital Markets and Economic Growth -- 14.5 Should Countries Close Their Capital Markets? -- 15 Not All Debt Is Created Equal -- 15.1 Fear of a US Debt Crisis -- 15.2 Households, Businesses, and Governments -- 15.3 Sovereign Debt Crises -- 15.4 A Second Look at the United States -- 15.5 Getting Out of Debt -- Conclusion -- Abbreviations and Acronyms -- Bibliography -- Index.. - 5 The Asian Crisis, 1997-1999 -- 5.1 Stable Economies and Rapid Growth -- 5.2 Explanations for Rapid Growth -- 5.3 The Onset of the Crisis in Thailand -- 5.4 Contagion and Common Fundamentals -- 5.5 Crisis Resolution -- 5.6 The Fallout -- 6 The Subprime Crisis in the United States -- 6.1 Vulnerabilities -- 6.2 Chronology -- 6.2.1 Too Big to Fail -- 6.2.2 Maintaining Credit Availability -- 6.3 Financial Reforms -- 6.3.1 Crisis Prevention -- 6.3.2 Crisis Mitigation -- 6.3.3 Prognosis -- 7 The Financial Crisis in Europe -- 7.1 The Single Currency Project -- 7.2 An Uneven Crisis -- 7.3 Bank Debt Becomes National Debt -- 7.4 The Doom Loop -- 7.5 Emergency Actions -- 7.6 Recessions Prolonged -- Part III Lessons -- 8 Markets Do Not Self-Regulate -- 8.1 Overconfidence in the Market -- 8.2 Market Reality -- 8.3 Empirically Speaking -- 9 Shadow Banks are Banks -- 9.1 No Bailout? -- 9.2 Shadow Banks -- 9.3 Securitization -- 9.4 Regulators and Incentives -- 9.5 Shadow Bank Depositors -- 9.6 Bank Panics with Shadow Banks -- 9.7 The Rise of Finance -- 10 Banks Need More Capital, Less Debt -- 10.1 Other People's Money -- 10.2 Leverage -- 10.3 Limits to Risk Models -- 10.4 Resistance to Increasing Capital -- 10.5 Capital and Risk Reduction -- 11 Monetary Policy Does Not Always Work -- 11.1 Overconfidence -- 11.2 The Rise of Monetary Policy -- 11.3 New Classical Economics -- 11.4 The Great Moderation -- 11.5 Zero Lower Bound -- 12 Fiscal Multipliers Are Larger Than Expected -- 12.1 Acts of Nature -- 12.2 The Keynesian Consensus -- 12.3 The Multiplier -- 12.4 Expectations -- 12.5 Keynesians and Anti-Keynesians -- 12.6 Testing Ideas with a Crisis -- 13 Monetary Integration Requires Fiscal Integration -- 13.1 The Grand Experiment -- 13.2 The United States Is a Monetary and Fiscal Union -- 13.3 The Euro and Optimal Currency Areas -- 13.4 Promoting the Euro.. - A Great Deal of Ruin provides an accessible introduction to the enduring problem of financial crises. Illustrated with historical analysis, case studies, and clear economic concepts, this book explains in three parts what financial crises are, how they are caused and what we can learn from them. It begins with a taxonomy of crises and a list of factors that increase the risk for countries experiencing a financial crisis. It then examines five of the most important crises in modern economic history, beginning with the Great Depression and ending with the subprime crisis in the United States and its evolution into a debt crisis in the Eurozone. The book concludes with a set of lessons that can be learnt from the crises of the past. It will appeal to university students as well as general readers who are curious to learn more about the recent subprime crisis and other financial crises.
Emner
Sjanger
Dewey
ISBN
9781108497343 (hbk.) : : £69.99. - 9781108739900 (pbk.) : : £26.99. - No price
ISBN(galt)
9781108588133 (PDF ebook) :

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