Political Power and Economic Policy : Theory, Analysis, and Empirical Applications
Gordon C. Rausser
Bok Engelsk 2011 · Electronic books.
| Annen tittel | |
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| Medvirkende | |
| Utgitt | Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 2011
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| Omfang | 1 online resource (538 p.)
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| Opplysninger | Description based upon print version of record.. - Cover; Title; Copyright; Contents; List of Figures; List of Tables; Preface; Part 1 POLITICAL POWER AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS; 1 Public Policy: The Lens of Political Economy; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 The Lens of Political Economy; 1.3 Literature Review; 24.3 The Impact of Development: A Conceptual Model This section summarizes the formal derivations in de Gorter and Swinnen (1998).; 1.4 Structure and Major Themes of the Book; 2 The Nash Solution to the Bargaining Problem; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 The Nash Solution to the Bargaining Problem with Fixed Disagreement Payoffs. - 2.3 The Pivotal Axiom and Alternative Approaches2.4 Conclusion; 3 The Harsanyi Solution to the Bargaining Problem; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Endogenous Disagreement Payoffs; 3.3 The n-Person Bargaining Game; 3.4 Reciprocal Power Relations; 3.4.1 Reciprocal Power in Two-Party Games; 3.4.2 Reciprocal Power in n-Party Games; 3.5 Conclusion; 4 Political-Economic Analysis; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Organization of the Political System; 4.3 The Political-Economic Structure; 4.4 Conflict Resolution and the Equilibrium Relations; 4.4.1 The Policy Center and One Organized Interest Group. - 4.4.2 One Policy Center and n Organized Interest Groups4.4.3 A Polycentric Configuration; 4.4.4 One Policy-Making Center, n organized Interest Groups, and K Unorganized but Responsive Interest Groups; 4.5 Conclusion; 5 Normative Political-Economic Analysis; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 Evaluation Criteria of Social Benefits and Costs; 5.3 Political-Economic Efficiency Conditions; 5.4 Evaluation of Structural Policies; 5.5 Conclusion; 6 Dynamic Political-Economic Analysis; 6.1 Introduction; 6.2 The General Structure of a Political Economy as a Dynamic System; 6.3 The Dynamics of Political Power. - 6.4 Political ""Traps'' and Policy Reforms6.5 Conclusion; Part 2 IDEOLOGY, PRESCRIPTION, AND POLITICAL POWER COEFFICIENTS; 7 Political Power, Ideology, and Political Organizational Structures; 7.1 Introduction; 7.2 The Nature of Ideology; 7.3 Ideological Commitment and Policy Formation; 7.4 Implications for Empirical Analysis; 7.5 The Organization of Interest Groups and Policy Formation; 7.6 Interest Groups and the Organization for Collective Action; 7.7 Political Entrepreneurs, Internal Group Organization, and Within-Group Equilibrium; 7.8 Group Political Preferences and Political Power. - 7.9 Implications of the Organization of Interest Groups7.10 Government Structure; 7.11 Political Parties; 7.12 Conclusion; 8 Political Power, Influence, and Lobbying; 8.1 Introduction; 8.2 General Formulation of the Framework; 8.3 Costs of Organization; 8.4 Lobbying as a Common-Agency Problem; 8.5 Lobbying under Asymmetric Information; 8.6 Expanding the Framework: PERTs and PESTs; 8.7 Conclusion; 9 Constitutional Prescription and Political Power Coefficients; 9.1 Introduction; 9.2 Constitutional Rules and Policy-Making Centers; 9.3 Evaluation of Alternative Constitutional Rules. - 9.4 Constitutional Space Prescription. - This book analyzes the links between political economics, governance structures and the distribution of political power in economic policy making.
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| Emner | |
| Sjanger | |
| Dewey | |
| ISBN | 9780521148009. - 9780521190169
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