Economic Crises as a Result of Distrust.
Emilio. Gullini
Bok Engelsk 2010 · Electronic books.
| Omfang | 1 online resource (178 pages)
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| Utgave | 1st ed.
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| Opplysninger | Intro -- ECONOMIC CRISES AS A RESULT OF DISTRUST -- TABLE OF CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- CHINESE FOREIGN EXCHANGE INTERVENTIONS -- EXECUTIVE SUMMARY -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. HOW ECONOMIC FACTORS DETERMINE EXCHANGE RATES AND INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTS -- III. MASSIVE INTERVENTION SINCE 2000 -- IV. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES -- A. Effects on China -- B. Effects on the United States -- V. DANGERS AHEAD -- VI. CONCLUSION -- APPENDIX: WHAT ARE INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTS? -- End Notes -- FINANCIAL CRISIS: LESSONS FROM CHILE -- SUMMARY -- COMPARING FINANCIAL CRISES -- THE CHILEAN BANKING CRISIS OF 1981-84 -- THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE -- Debt Restructuring -- Restoring Bank Balance Sheets -- Restructuring Distressed Banks -- POSSIBLE LESSONS FROM CHILE'S BANK CRISIS -- End Notes -- FINANCIAL CRISIS: LESSONSFROM SWEDEN -- SUMMARY -- BACKGROUND -- DEREGULATION -- THE FINANCIAL CRISIS -- LESSONS LEARNED FROM SWEDEN'S EXPERIENCE -- End Notes -- FINANCIAL MARKET TURMOIL AND U.S. MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE -- SUMMARY -- INTRODUCTION -- EVIDENCE OF TIGHTER CREDIT CONDITIONS -- THE EFFECT OF TIGHTER CREDIT CONDITIONS ON MACROECONOMIC ACTIVITY -- Impact of Tight Credit on Residential Investment -- Impact of Tight Credit on Business Investment -- Impact of Tight Credit on Consumer Spending -- The Effect on Consumer Spending of Falling Asset Values Reducing Household Wealth -- The Double-Edged Influence of the International Sector on GDP -- International Flows of Goods -- International Flows of Capital (Assets) -- AN ESTIMATE OF THE POTENTIAL DRAG ON REAL GDP GROWTH FROM A DIMINISHED FLOW OF CREDIT -- A Simulation of the Effect of a Diminished Credit Flow on Real GDP -- ECONOMIC POLICY RESPONSES TO THE CREDIT CRISIS -- Conventional Macroeconomic Policy -- Monetary Policy -- Fiscal Policy -- The Fed as "Lender of Last Resort" -- Extraordinary Measures (Large Scale Intervention).. - How Will TARP Work? -- Will TARP Solve the Problem? -- FORECASTING THE U.S. ECONOMY'S PATHTHROUGH THE FINANCIAL CRISIS -- End Notes -- FINANCIAL MELTDOWN ANDPOLICY RESPONSE -- INTRODUCTION -- UNDERLYING CAUSES -- INDEPENDENCE IS AN UNSUSTAINABLE BUSINESS MODEL FOR INVESTMENT BANKS -- FAIR VALUE ACCOUNTING -- INTERVENTION PRINCIPLES -- FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC -- LEHMAN BROTHERS -- MERRILL LYNCH -- AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP (AIG) -- FEDERAL RESERVE -- FINANCIAL PRECIPICE -- Breaking the Buck Causes Runs on Money Market Mutual Funds -- BIRTH OF A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN -- WEEKEND AND MONDAY DEVELOPMENTS -- HEDGE FUNDS -- CONCLUSION -- End Notes -- GOVERNMENT POLICY BLUNDERS AND GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS -- MACROECONOMIC POLICY FACTORS -- MICROECONOMIC POLICY FACTORS -- UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES FROMFINANCIAL REGULATIONS -- UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES FROM HOUSING POLICIES PROMOTING HOME OWNERSHIP -- MISALIGNED PRIVATE INCENTIVES -- METHODOLOGICAL ERRORS -- CONCLUSION -- End Notes -- HOOVER'S LETHAL ECONOMICPOLICY MIX -- MONETARY CAUSES OF THE 1920S STOCK MARKET BUBBLE AND ITS POPPING -- ACQUIESCENCE IN MONETARY CONTRACTION AND THREE ROUNDS OF BANK FAILURES -- CORPORATISM -- PROTECTIONISM -- COLLAPSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM DUE TO THE PURSUIT OF INCOMPATIBLEPOLICY OBJECTIVES -- RECORD PEACETIME INCREASE IN SPENDING -- HIGHER TAX RATES -- CONCLUSION -- End Notes -- HOUSING BUBBLE AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS -- KINDLEBERGER ASSET BUBBLE FRAMEWORK -- DISPLACEMENT OF EXISTING EXPECTATIONS -- CREDIT EXPANSION -- NEW ECONOMY -- SWINDLES -- OVERTRADING, REVULSION, AND DISCREDIT -- EXTENT OF THE FALLOUT -- CONCLUSION -- End Notes -- HOUSING BUBBLE AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS - VULNERABILITIES -- INTRODUCTION -- ALTERNATIVE FINANCIAL SYSTEM -- HIGHLY LEVERAGED NON-DEPOSITORYFINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.. - INTERMEDIATION AND LIQUIDITY AND MATURITY TRANSFORMATION -- MICROECONOMIC FACTORS - REGULATIONAND SUPERVISION -- MICROECONOMIC FACTORS - PRIVATE FIRMS -- IGNITION OF A FINANCIAL PANIC -- MONETARY RESPONSE -- BEAR STEARNS -- FISCAL RESPONSE -- REGULATORY RESPONSE -- GLOBAL CREDIT LOSSES AND LIKELYEFFECTS ON U.S. ECONOMY -- CONCLUSION -- End Notes -- HOW THE CREDIT CRISIS AFFECTS YOU -- OVERVIEW -- How the Credit Crisis Fuels Economic Slowdown -- THE ONSET OF THE CREDIT CRISIS -- The Securitization of Loans -- From Your House to Wall Street -- The Deflation of the Housing Bubble -- Large Financial Institutions Fail Overnight -- Confidence in the Health of Financial Institutions Drops, Causing Credit Freeze Among Banks -- Other Sources of Credit Also Freezing Up -- HOW WILL THE CREDIT CRUNCH IMPACT ME? -- The Vicious Cycle -- HOW WILL THE EMERGENCY ECONOMICSTABILIZATION ACT HELP THE CREDIT CRISIS? -- POLICY LESSON'S FROM JAPAN'SLOST DECADE -- SOWING SEEDS -- BANKING CRISIS -- LOST DECADE -- DIFFERENCES -- LESSONS FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS -- End Notes -- CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS -- SUMMARY -- WHAT IS A CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP? -- HOW ARE CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS USED? -- WHAT IS AN EXAMPLE OF A CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP? -- WHAT IS NOTIONAL PRINCIPAL OR NOTIONAL AMOUNT? -- WHAT IS A REFERENCE ENTITY? -- WHO PARTICIPATES IN THE CREDITDEFAULT SWAP MARKET? -- WHAT IS THE ISDA AND WHAT DOES IT DO? -- DO CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS CREATE SYSTEMIC RISK? -- HOW HAVE CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS BEENUSED IN SECURITIZATION? -- WHO REGULATES CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS? -- HOW DID THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CONSERVATORSHIP FOR FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC AFFECTCREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS? -- End Notes -- CHAPTER SOURCES -- INDEX.
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| ISBN | 9781613245279
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