How to Know : A Practicalist Conception of Knowledge
Stephen. Hetherington
Bok Engelsk 2011 · Electronic books.
| Annen tittel | |
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| Utgitt | Hoboken : : Wiley, , 2011.
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| Omfang | 1 online resource (527 p.)
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| Opplysninger | Description based upon print version of record.. - Cover; Contents; Halftitle page; Title page; Copyright; Dedication; Preface and Acknowledgements; Chapter 1: The Standard Analytic Conception of Knowledge; 1.1. 'Knowing is a Belief State (or Something Similar)'; 1.2 'Knowledge is Well Supported'; 1.3 'Knowledge is Absolute'; 1.4 'Knowing Includes not being Gettiered'; 1.5 'Knowledge-that is Fundamentally Theoretical, not Knowledge-how'; 1.6 The Standard Analytic Conception of Knowledge; 1.7 Prima Facie Core Problems; Chapter 2: Knowledge-that as Knowledge-how; 2.1 The Rylean Distinction; 2.2 The Rylean Argument. - 2.3 Wittgenstein on Rule-following2.4 The Knowledge-as-Ability Hypothesis; 2.5 Justification; 2.6 Grades of Knowledge; 2.7 Denying Knowledge-Absolutism: Clear Precedents; 2.8 Denying Knowledge-Absolutism: Possibly only Apparent Precedents; 2.9 Sceptical Challenges; 2.10 Sceptical Limitations; 2.11 Epistemic Agents; 2.13 Rylean Mistakes; 2.12 Abilities; 2.14 Conclusion; Chapter 3: Gettier? No Problem; 3.1 Gettier Situations; 3.2 A Counter-Example to 'Gettier's Official Result'; 3.3 Ordinary Gettiered Knowledge; 3.4 A Meta-Gettier Problem; 3.5 Objections Answered. - 3.6 Gettier-Luck as Veritic Luck?3.7 Gettier-Luck is not Veritic Luck; 3.8 Gettier-Luck is Combinatorial Luck; 3.9 Combinatorial Luck: Applications; 3.10 Knowing in a Combinatorially Lucky Way; 3.11 Gettier-Holism Versus Gettier-Partialism; 3.12 Combinatorial Safety; 3.13 Combinatorial Gradational Safety; 3.14 Epistemological Privilege and Epistemological Empathy; 3.15 Gettier Situations and Sceptical Situations; 3.16 Timothy Williamson; Chapter 4: Is this a World where Knowledge has to Include Justification?; 4.1 Justificationism, Broadly Understood. - 4.2 The 'Causally Stable World' (CSW) Thesis4.3 Knowledge Within Causally Fluky Worlds; 4.4 Knowledge as Putatively Pervasive; 4.5 Non-tethering Justification; 4.6 Linguistic Intuitions; 4.7 Kinds of Intension; 4.8 Conditional Justificationism; 4.9 Knowledge Within Different Possible Worlds; 4.10 Wholly General Justificationism; 4.11 A Thin or Minimal Concept of Justificationism; 4.12 Knowledge Within Causally Semi-fluky Worlds; 4.13 Evidence and Counter-Evidence; 4.14 Timothy Williamson; Chapter 5: Knowledge-that as How-Knowledge; 5.1 Knowing How it is that p. - 5.15 Knowing as Understanding?. - 5.2 How-Knowledge that p and Gradualism5.3 Degrees of Knowledge and Degrees of Belief; 5.4 How-Knowledge that p and Truthmakers; 5.5 Knowledge that p and Gradualism; 5.6 Knowledge-Gradualism's Central Concept; 5.7 Can there be Minimal Knowledge?; 5.8 Minimal Knowledge as Foundational Knowledge; 5.9 Knowledge-Gradualism: Closure and Scepticism; 5.10 Knowledge-Gradualism: Content Externalism and Self-Knowledge; 5.11 How not to Argue for Knowledge-Absolutism; 5.12 Linguistic Evidence: Igor Douven; 5.13 Linguistic Evidence: Jason Stanley; 5.14 How-Knowledge-how that p. - Some key aspects of contemporary epistemology deserve to be challenged, and How to Know does just that. This book argues that several long-standing presumptions at the heart of the standard analytic conception of knowledge are false, and defends an alternative, a practicalist conception of knowledge. Presents a philosophically original conception of knowledge, at odds with some central tenets of analytic epistemologyOffers a dissolution of epistemology's infamous Gettier problem - explaining why the supposed problem was never really a problem in the first pla
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| Emner | |
| Sjanger | |
| Dewey | |
| ISBN | 9780470658123
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