The problem of evil
Michael Tooley.
Bok Engelsk 2019 · Electronic books.
| Originaltittel | [ The problem of evil .] Engelsk
|
|---|---|
| Omfang | 1 online resource (81 pages) : : digital, PDF file(s).
|
| Utgave | 1st ed.
|
| Opplysninger | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 09 Aug 2019).. - Cover -- Title page -- Copyright page -- The Problem of Evil -- Contents -- Introduction and Overview -- The Scope of the Problem of Evil and of Arguments from Evil: Relevant Conceptions of God -- Incompatibility Arguments versus Evidential Arguments -- The Structure of the Element -- 1 Formulations of Arguments from Evil: Important Preliminary Issues -- 1.1 Axiological Terms versus Deontological Terms: Which Should Be Used? -- 1.2 Highly General Propositions about Evils versus Much More Specific Propositions -- 1.3 Justified Beliefs versus What Is Known in Some Strong Sense of 'Knowledge' -- 2 Incompatibility Arguments from Evil -- 2.1 The Existence of Suffering by Nonhuman Animals That Are Not Persons -- 2.2 The Suffering by Nonhuman Animals Is Undeserved Suffering -- 2.3 A Physicalist Alternative to Reincarnation? -- 2.4 A Soul-Making Theodicy Is Also Ruled Out -- 2.5 The Suffering in Question Is Not Caused by Moral Agents -- Some Comments on the Argument to this Point -- 2.6 Allowing Undeserved Suffering Cannot Be Justified by Appealing to the Great Good of the Existence of Laws of Nature -- 2.7 Summing Up Part 1 of the Incompatibility Argument from Evil: No Nonreligious Theodicy or Defense Provides a Satisfactory Answer to the Present Incompatibility Argument from Evil -- 2.8 Part 2 of the Incompatibility Argument from Evil -- Under What Conditions Is Allowing Undeserved Suffering Morally Permissible? -- Under What Conditions Is an Omnipotent and Omniscient Being's Allowing Undeserved Suffering Morally Permissible? -- Condition 1 Could Not Obtain for an Omnipotent and Omniscient Being -- Condition 2 Could Not Obtain for an Omnipotent and Omniscient Being -- Condition 3 Could Not Obtain for an Omnipotent and Omniscient Being -- Condition 4 Could Not Obtain for an Omnipotent and Omniscient Being.. - 4.6.1 The Case of a Single Evil - the Underlying Idea -- 4.6.2 Step One: The Case of a Single Prima Facie Evil -- Conclusion 1: The Case of a Single Prima Facie Evil -- Conclusion 2: The Relevance of a Single Evil to the Existence of God -- 4.6.3 Step Two: The Case of Multiple Prima Facie Evils -- 4.7 Is the Idea of Logical Probability Defensible? -- 4.8 Objections to Equiprobability-Based Arguments from Evil? -- 4.8.1 Alexander Pruss -- 4.8.2 Richard Otte -- Part 1: The Case of a Single Prima Facie Evil -- Part 2: The Case of Multiple Prima Facie Evils -- Summary and Conclusions -- Appendix -- References.. - An Omnipotent and Omniscient Being Is Never Justified in Not Preventing Undeserved Suffering by a Sentient Nonperson -- Conclusion of the Incompatibility from Evil Argument: The Nonexistence of God -- 2.9 Some Comments on the Above Argument -- 3 Skeptical Theism: Human Epistemological Limitations and Incompatiblity Arguments from Evil -- 3.1 Skeptical Theism -- 3.2 Arguments for Skeptical Theism's Skeptical Thesis -- 3.3 What Is the Rationale Behind Appealing to Skeptical Theism? -- 3.4 Skeptical Theism and Incompatibility Arguments from Evil: New Work for Skeptical Theists -- 4 Evidential Arguments from Evil -- 4.1 The Argument from Evil and Instantial Generalization -- 4.1.1 William Rowe's Instantial Generalization Argument from Evil -- 4.1.2 The Problem with Rowe's Argument -- 4.2 Purely Deductive Probabilistic Arguments from Evil -- 4.2.1 A Simple Argument -- 4.2.2 The Fundamental Problem with This Type of Argument -- 4.3 Abductive Arguments from Evil -- 4.3.1 The Idea of Abduction -- 4.3.2 Hume's Discovery -- 4.3.3 Paul Draper and the Biological Function of Pleasure and Pain -- 4.3.4 Trent Dougherty's Discovery: A Crucial Supplementation of Draper's Abductive Argument from Evil -- 4.4 Logical Probability and Fundamental Equiprobability Principles -- Equiprobability Principle 1: Families of Properties -- Equiprobability Principle 2: The Interchange of Individuals -- 4.5 Equiprobability-Based Evidential Arguments from Evil: An Overview -- 4.5.1 A Simple, Prima Facie Argument for Atheism: Atheism as the Default Position -- 4.5.2 Possible Alternatives with Regard to Equiprobability Evidential Arguments from Evil -- Proposition 1: The Probability of God and the Probability of a Single All Things Considered Evil -- 4.6 The Most Fundamental Equiprobability-Based Evidential Argument from Evil: From Single Evils to Multiple Evils.. - Chapter 1 addresses some preliminary issues that it is important to think about in formulating arguments from evil. Chapter 2 is then concerned with the question of how an incompatibility argument from evil is best formulated, and with possible responses to such arguments. Chapter 3 then focuses on skeptical theism, and on the work that skeptical theists need to do if they are to defend their claim of having defeated incompatibility versions of the argument from evil. Finally, Chapter 4 discusses evidential arguments from evil, and four different kinds of evidential argument are set out and critically examined.
|
| Emner | |
| Sjanger | |
| Dewey | |
| ISBN | 9781108749053 (pbk.) : : £15.00. - No price
|
| ISBN(galt) | 9781108801621 (PDF ebook) :
|
