Moral skepticisms
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong.
Bok Engelsk 2006 · Electronic books.
| Utgitt | Oxford : : Oxford University Press, , 2006.
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| Omfang | 1 online resource (286 p.)
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| Opplysninger | Description based upon print version of record.. - Contents; PART I: ISSUES; Chapter 1. What Is Moral Epistemology?; Chapter 2. Are Moral Beliefs Truth-Apt?; Chapter 3. Are Any Moral Beliefs True?; Chapter 4. Are Any Moral Beliefs Justified?; Chapter 5. In Contrast with What?; Chapter 6. Classy Moral Pyrrhonism; PART II: THEORIES; Chapter 7. Naturalism; Chapter 8. Normativism; Chapter 9. Intuitionism; Chapter 10. Coherentism; References; Index; A; B; C; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M; N; O; P; Q; R; S; T; U; V; W; Z. - Sinnott-Armstrong here provides an extensive survey of the difficult subject of moral beliefs. He covers theories that grapple with questions of morality such as naturalism, normativism, intuitionism, and coherentism. He then defends his own theory that he calls ""moderate moral skepticism,"" which is that moral beliefs can be justified, but not extremely justified.
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| Sjanger | |
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| ISBN | 0195187725. - 9780195187724
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