Force without war : U.S. armed forces as a political instrument
Barry M. Blechman
Bok · 1978
| Utgitt | Wash. D.C. : Brookings , 1978
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| Omfang | 584s.
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| Opplysninger | Bibliografi s. 557-563 The United States has used military force short of war as an instrument of diplomacy on many occasions and in many areas of the world in the years since the Second World War. This book describes and analyzes the circumstances accompanying 215 shows of force and examines how effective these actions were in helping to attain US foreign policy objectives.. - 1. Introduction -- The Armed Forces as a Political Instrument -- The Basic Concept -- Incidents and Sources -- The Question of Utility -- PART ONE: AGGREGATE ANALYSES -- 2. The Historical Record -- The Political Environment -- Trends in the Size, Type, and Activity of Participating Military Forces -- 3. The Question of Utility: Theory and Practice -- Objectives, Not Motives -- Neither Success nor Failure, but Outcomes -- Modes and Styles -- Characteristics of the Sample -- 4. Findings -- Overall Outcomes of Incidents -- Individual Outcomes and the Political Use of Armed Forces -- Outcomes and the Level, Type, Movement, and Activities of Armed Forces -- The Association between Outcomes, the Use of Armed Forces, and Modes -- Summary -- 5. Situational Factors -- Previous Uses of U.S. Armed Forces in the Region -- Prior Change in the Size of U.S. Forces Deployed in the Region -- Commitments -- Administration Attention and Use of Coercive Rhetoric -- Personal Diplomacy -- Presidential Popularity -- The Role of the Soviet Union -- Conflict and Cooperation between the Superpowers -- The Strategic Weapons "Balance -- Structure of the Situation -- Summary -- PART TWO: CASE STUDIES -- 6. The Laotian War of 1962 and the Indo-Pakistani Warof 1971 -- THE LAOTIAN WAR OF 1962 -- U.S. Behavior -- Target Behavior -- Third Party Behavior -- Outcomes -- Evaluation -- THE INDO-PAKISTANI WAR OF 1971 -- U.S. Behavior -- Target Behavior -- Third Party Behavior -- Evaluation -- COMPARISON OF THE TWO WARS -- 7. Lebanon, 1958, and Jordan, 1970 -- U.S. INTERVENTION IN LEBANON, 1958 -- Historical Background -- Events Leading to Crisis -- U.S. Behavior in the Crisis -- The Impact on Domestic Lebanese Politics -- Egyptian Reactions -- The Soviet Reaction -- The British Role -- Outcomes of the Crisis -- Evaluation -- U.S. POLICY IN THE JORDAN CRISIS, 1970. Regional and International Developments -- Toward Confrontation in Jordan -- Civil War -- The Actors and Their Objectives -- U.S. Behavior in the Crisis -- The Soviet Response -- The Regional Participants -- Outcomes -- Evaluation -- 8. The Dominican Republic, 1961-66 -- Ousting the Trujillos, 1961 -- The 1965 Crisis -- Conclusions -- 9. The Berlin Crises of 1958-59 and 1961 -- Historical Background -- Major Participants in the 1958-59 Crisis and Their Relationships -- The Problem of Soviet Policy Formulation -- The Berlin Crisis of 1958-59 -- The Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers -- Eisenhower's Invitation to Khrushchev -- Between Two Crises: September 1959 to February 1961 -- The Crisis of 1961 -- A Comparative Evaluation, 1958-59 and 1961 -- 10. Yugoslavia, 1951, and Czechoslovakia, 1968 -- Yugoslavia, 1951 -- Czechoslovakia, 1968 -- Conclusions -- PART THREE: CONCLUSIONS -- 11. Learning from the Past -- The Special Role of Force -- Correlates of Success -- A Last Word -- Appendixes -- A. Bibliographical Sources for Incidents -- B. The Incidents -- C. Sample Selection and Characteristics -- D. Bibliography for Utility Analysis -- Index.
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| Emner | |
| Dewey | |
| ISBN | 0-8157-0985-4
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