Pillars of Prosperity : The Political Economics of Development Clusters
Timothy. Besley
Bok Engelsk 2011 · Electronic books.
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| Utgitt | Princeton : : Princeton University Press, , 2011.
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| Omfang | 1 online resource (392 p.)
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| Opplysninger | Description based upon print version of record.. - Cover; Contents; Series Foreword; Preface; Chapter 1: Development Clusters; 1.1 Salient Correlations; 1.2 The Main Questions; 1.3 Fiscal Capacity; 1.4 Legal Capacity; 1.5 Political Violence; 1.6 State Spaces; 1.7 Development Assistance; 1.8 Political Reform; 1.9 Main Themes; 1.10 Final Remarks; 1.11 Notes on the Literature; Chapter 2: Fiscal Capacity; 2.1 The Core Model; 2.1.1 Basic Structure; 2.1.2 Politically Optimal Policy; 2.1.3 Fiscal-Capacity Investments; 2.1.4 Normative Benchmark: A Pigouvian Planner; 2.1.5 Three Types of States; 2.1.6 Taking Stock; 2.2 Developing the Model. - 2.2.1 Microfoundations for Fiscal Capacity2.2.2 More General Models for Public Goods; 2.2.3 Polarization/Heterogeneity; 2.2.4 Income Inequality; 2.2.5 Differences in Group Size; 2.2.6 Tax Distortions; 2.2.7 From Trade to Income Taxes; 2.2.8 An Infinite-Horizon Model; 2.3 Empirical Implications and Data; 2.4 Final Remarks; 2.5 Notes on the Literature; Chapter 3: Legal Capacity; 3.1 The Core Model with Legal Capacity; 3.1.1 Politically Optimal Policy; 3.1.2 Investments in State Capacity; 3.1.3 Comparative Statics; 3.1.4 Taking Stock; 3.2 Developing the Model; 3.2.1 Microeconomic Foundations. - 3.2.2 The Genius of Taxation3.2.3 Private Capital Accumulation; 3.2.4 Predation and Corruption; 3.3 Empirical Implications and Data; 3.4 Final Comments; 3.5 Notes on the Literature; Chapter 4: Political Violence; 4.1 The Core Model with Political Violence; 4.1.1 Model Modifications; 4.1.2 Policy; 4.1.3 Investments in Political Violence; 4.1.4 Empirical Implications; 4.2 Developing the Model; 4.2.1 Asymmetries; 4.2.2 Polarization, Greed, and Grievance; 4.2.3 Anarchy; 4.2.4 Conflict in a Predatory State; 4.2.5 Investing in Coercive Capacity; 4.3 From Theory to Empirical Testing. - 4.4 Data and Results4.4.1 Data; 4.4.2 Cross-Sectional Correlations; 4.4.3 Econometric Estimates; 4.5 Final Remarks; 4.6 Notes on the Literature; Chapter 5: State Spaces; 5.1 State Capacity in the Comprehensive Core Model; 5.1.1 Equilibrium Political Turnover; 5.1.2 Investments in State Capacity Revisited; 5.2 Developing the Model; 5.3 Empirical Implications; 5.4 Putting the Pieces Together; 5.5 Final Remarks; 5.6 Notes on the Literature; Chapter 6: Development Assistance; 6.1 The Core Model with Aid; 6.1.1 Cash Aid; 6.1.2 Technical Assistance; 6.1.3 Military Assistance. - 6.1.4 Postconflict Assistance6.2 Final Remarks; 6.3 Notes on the Literature; Chapter 7: Political Reform; 7.1 The Core Model and Political Reform; 7.1.1 Political Reform under a Veil of Ignorance; 7.1.2 Strategic Political Reform; 7.2 Developing the Model; 7.2.1 Micropolitical Foundations for θ; 7.2.2 Micropolitical Foundations for γ; 7.2.3 Constitutional Rules; 7.2.4 Political Violence; 7.2.5 Trust; 7.2.6 Governance; 7.3 Political Reform in Practice; 7.4 Final Remarks; 7.5 Notes on the Literature; Chapter 8: Lessons Learned; 8.1 What We Have Learned; 8.1.1 Answers to the Three Main Questions. - 8.1.2 Our Analysis and Traditional Development Research
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Economic development Economic policy Business & Economics Vis mer... Economic Theory
Næringsklynger Økonomisk politikk Økonomisk utvikling næringsklynger økonomisk politikk utvikling |
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| ISBN | 0691152683. - 9780691152684
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