The Role of Auctions in Emission Allowance Allocations for Greenhouse Gases.
Aubrey D. O'Connor
Bok Engelsk 2010 · Electronic books.
| Omfang | 1 online resource (118 pages)
|
|---|---|
| Utgave | 1st ed.
|
| Opplysninger | Intro -- THE ROLE OF AUCTIONS IN EMISSION ALLOWANCE ALLOCATIONS FOR GREENHOUSE GASES -- THE ROLE OF AUCTIONS IN EMISSION ALLOWANCE ALLOCATIONS FOR GREENHOUSE GASES -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- Chapter 1 TESTIMONY OF IAN BOWLES, SECRETARY OF ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS, BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ENERGY INDEPENDENCE AND GLOBAL WARMING -- Auction v. Allocate - Protecting the Public's Interest -- Use of Auction Proceeds - Maximizing Ratepayers Savings and Environmental Benefits -- Lessons for a Federal Program -- Chapter 2 WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF DALLAS BURTRAW, BEFORE THE "CAP, AUCTION & -- TRADE HEARING: AUCTIONS AND REVENUE RECYCLING UNDER CARBON CAP AND TRADE -- Summary of Testimony -- 1. What are the efficiency benefits of robust auctions of allowances under a cap-and-trade system? -- 2. Would free allocation of allowances significantly reduce economic impacts on consumers, as compared with a full auction of allowances, and if not, why not? -- 3. To what extent do full or robust auctions deprive polluters of the capital needed to invest in achieving substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions? -- 4. What proportion of allowance value is needed to compensate polluting firms for the economic impacts of climate change legislation? -- 5. How feasible is it to design an allocation formula that could efficiently target compensation to those firms adversely affected by climate change legislation and avoid windfall profits? -- 6. To what extent are the economic impacts of legislation on polluting firms likely to be spread among shareholders who hold diversified portfolios, and how does this affect the rationale for or against seeking to compensate firms? -- End Notes -- Chapter 3 TESTIMONY OF ROBERT GREENSTEIN, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITES, BEFORE THE "CAP, AUCTION & -- TRADE HEARING.. - Analyst in Environmental Policy -- Summary -- Introduction -- Auctions -- Implementation Benefits -- Polluter Pays Principle -- Potential Minimization of Costs on Society -- Avoidance of Economic Concerns from No-Cost Distribution -- Auction Design Issues -- Design Considerations -- Design Options -- Reserve Price -- Auction Frequency -- No-Cost Distribution to Covered Sources -- Potential Benefits -- Mitigation of Disproportionate Costs -- Political Feasibility -- Concerns -- Undesirable Effects in the Electricity Sector -- Overcompensation to Covered Entities -- Treatment of New and Retiring Sources -- Distribution of Allowance Value: Options and Considerations -- Overview and Estimate of Allowance Value -- Compliance Costs Versus the Value of Emission Allowances -- Estimates of Allowance Value -- Options for Allowance Value Distribution -- Provide Transition Assistance to Carbon-Intensive Industries -- Offset Reductions in Distortionary Taxes -- Distribution to Non-Covered Entities -- Distribution to Support Specific Objectives -- Policy Considerations -- Reduce Costs, Alleviate Burdens, or Promote Technology -- Regressive or Progressive Economic Effects -- Appendix A. What Is a Cap-and-Trade System? -- Appendix B. Allowance Allocation Strategy under S. 2191 (as Reported) -- End Notes -- Chapter 8 TRADE-OFFS IN ALLOCATING ALLOWANCES FOR CO2 EMISSIONS -- Overview -- Where Would Costs Be Felt under a Cap-and-Trade Program? -- Consumers Would Be Likely to Bear Most of the Cost Burden -- Producers and Workers Would Bear Transitional Costs -- Pressure on the Federal Budget Would Increase as Well -- Selling Allowances Could Significantly Reduce Overall Costs -- Distributing Allowances for Free Could Compensate Some Parties -- Fairness and Efficiency Implications of Different Allocation Strategies -- End Notes -- INDEX -- Blank Page.. - Four Key Numbers on Climate Policy, Low-Income Consumers, and the Budget -- 1. 750 - 950 per year: The average increase in energy-related costs for the poorest fifth of the population from a modest (15 percent) emissions reduction -- 2. 50 billion to 300 billion per year: Resources potentially generated by climate-change policies to help low-income consumers and to address other climate-change-related needs -- 3. Approximately 14 percent: Share of auction proceeds needed to fully offset the increased energy-related costs faced by low-income consumers -- 4. Less than 15 percent: Share of potential budget resources needed to fully compensate energy companies and other emitters for financial losses due to climate-change policies -- Avoiding Regressive Outcomes qhile Meeting Other Climate-Related Priorities -- Designing Climate-Change Legislation That Shields Low-Income Households from Increased Poverty and Hardship -- Conclusion -- End Notes -- Chapter 4 OPENING STATEMENT FOR EDWARD J. MARKEY (D-MA) BEFORE THE "CAP, AUCTION & -- TRADE HEARING" -- Chapter 5 TESTIMONY OF JOHN D. PODESTA BEFORE THE "CAP, AUCTION & -- TRADE HEARING" -- End Notes -- Chapter 6 WRITTEN STATEMENT BY PETER ZAPFEL, DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR ENVIRONMENT, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, BRUSSELS, BEFORE THE "CAP, AUCTION & -- TRADE HEARING" -- Introduction -- Allocation provisions in EU ETS Directive -- Existing Rules for the First and Second Trading Period -- Rules for Inclusion of Aviation during the Second Trading Period -- Proposed Rules for the Third Trading Period -- Use of Auction Revenue -- Proposal for the Third Trading Period -- Phase 2 Auction Revenues -- Expected Economic Impacts of Auctioning and Revenue Recycling -- Final remarks -- End Notes -- Chapter 7 EMISSION ALLOWANCE ALLOCATION IN A CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM: OPTIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS.
|
| Emner | |
| Sjanger | |
| Dewey | |
| ISBN | 9781611228328
|
| ISBN(galt) |
