The Worldwide Crisis in Fisheries : Economic Models and Human Behavior


Colin W. Clark
Bok Engelsk 2006 · Electronic books.
Utgitt
Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 2006
Omfang
1 online resource (271 p.)
Opplysninger
Description based upon print version of record.. - Cover; Half-title; Title; Copyright; Contents; Introduction; 1 Perspective; 1.1 A Simple Bioeconomic Model; 1.2 Bionomic Equilibrium; 1.3 Regulation of Fishing Effort; 1.4 Overcapacity; 1.5 Subsidies; Buy-Back Programs; 1.6 Individual Quotas; Diffculties Associated with ITQs; Community Quotas; 1.7 Fishery Resources as Natural Capital; 1.8 Multispecies Fisheries and Ecosystem Based Management; 1.9 The Role of Uncertainty; Risk Management; Institutional Change; 1.10 The Future; 2 Dynamic Bioeconomic Models; 2.1 A Dynamic Model; Constant-E ort Harvesting; Predictions of the Constant-Effort Model. - 2.2 Robustness of the Schaefer ModelDepensation; An Alternative Catch Equation; CPUE Profiles; 2.3 Dynamic Bioeconomics; The Unregulated Open-Access Fishery; Dissipation of Economic Rent; The Possibility of Extinction; 2.4 Dynamically Optimal Fishing; The Optimal Equilibrium Biomass; What is "optimal"?; Discounting and Conservation; Zero Discounting; Present-Future Tradeoff; What do the Fishermen Know?; What do the Scientists Know?; What Use is the Dynamic Optimization Model?; Economic Incentives; Recovery of a Depleted Fish Stock; Irreversible Changes; Stock Assessment; 2.5 Uncertainty. - 2.6 Management ImplicationsTAC-Regulated Management: The "Derby" Fishery; TAC-Based Regulation; Trip Limits; The Limited-Access Fishery; 2.7 Age-Structured Population Models; Growth Overfishing; An Age-Structured Dynamic Model; Stock-Recruitment; Unregulated Open Access; Fishery Management; Economically Optimal Fishing; 2.8 Summary of Chapter 2; 3 Investment and Overcapacity; 3.1 Fixed versus Variable Costs; 3.2 The Open-Access Fishery; The State-Space Control Diagram; Perfect Foresight; Vessel Depreciation; Non-malleability Assumption; Partial Malleability; An Alternative Catch Equation. - A Less Extreme ModelConsequences of Anticipation; Limited Entry; 3.3 A Dynamic Optimization Model; Vessel Depreciation; Management Implications; Alternative Catch Equation; 3.4 Regulated Open Access and Buy-Back Programs; Buy-Back Programs; Mandatory, Fishery-Financed Buy-Backs; Implications and Limitations of the Analysis; Multipurpose Fleets and Spillover Effects; Capital Stuffing; 3.5 Summary of Chapter 3; 4 Fisheries Management; 4.1 Royalties; Information and Controllability; Effort Royalties; Fleet Capacity; 4.2 The Limited-Entry Fishery; Strategic Behavior by Firms. - A Source-Sink Model. - Capital Stuffing: Nonlinear Costs4.3 Individual Fishing Quotas; Individual Fishing Quotas; Characteristics of the IFQ System; Pooling of Quotas; Transferable Quotas; Quota Leasing; Finite-Term Quotas; The IFQ Controversy; Combining IFQs and Catch Royalties; Conservation Incentives; Catch Royalties in an ITQ Fishery; Other Types of Royalty; IFQs, ITQs and Property Rights; Individual Effort Quotas; Variability in Catch Rates; Stock Fluctuations and Quota Shares; Setting the Annual TAC; 4.4 Quota Auctions; 4.5 Some Aspects of Multispecies Fisheries; A Predator-Prey Model; A Mixed-Species Model. - New management programs are suggested, to improve the state of the world's fisheries.
Emner
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Dewey
ISBN
0521549396. - 0521840058. - 9780521549394. - 9780521840057

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