The Foundations of European Union Competition Law : The Objective and Principles of Article 102
Renato. Nazzini
Bok Engelsk 2011 · Electronic books.
| Annen tittel | |
|---|---|
| Utgitt | Oxford : : Oxford University Press, , c2011.
|
| Omfang | 1 online resource (1131 p.)
|
| Opplysninger | Description based upon print version of record.. - Cover; Title Page; Copyright Page; Dedication; Preface; Contents; List of Figures; List of Abbreviations; Table of Cases; Table of Treaties and Conventions; Table of European Union Legislation; Table of National Legislation; 1 Introduction; I Normative Foundations; 2 Normative Theory of Competition Law; (a) Definition of the long-term consumer welfare objective; (b) Redistribution of wealth; (c) Imperfections in corporate governance; (d) Enforcement, efficiency, and institutional capability; (e) The misuse of the consumer welfare objective; (a) The problem; (b) Information asymmetry. - (b) Collective entity test. - (b) Neighbouring markets(c) The test for multi-market abuses; III Tests of Abuse; 6 The Tests of Intent; (a) Free trade as a key driver of long-term social welfare; (b) Above-cost rebates; (c) Refusal to supply; (d) Raising rivals' costs; (e) Discrimination; (f) Naked exploitation; (a) The problem; (b) Inadequacy of the recoupment test; (c) The test of intent in predation; (d) Recoupment as predatory incentive; (e) The no economic sense test as a test of intent; (f) The predation test in the Guidance on Article 102; (a) The problem; (b) The enforcement risks associated with tying. - (c) Intent and incentive for anti-competitive tying7 The As Efficient Competitor Test; 8 The Consumer Harm Test; (a) The problem of balancing investment incentives and competitive harm; (b) Indispensability; (c) Intensity of the exclusionary effect; (d) Raising rivals' costs; (e) Clarifying the consumer harm test in refusal to supply; (f) Refusal to supply an existing customer; 9 Defences; (a) Allocative efficiency; (b) Productive efficiency; (c) Dynamic efficiency; IV Analytic of the Concept of Dominance; 10 Single Dominance; 11 Collective Dominance; (a) The two-pronged structure of the test. - (c) Self-selection(d) Lobbying; (e) Limited (not general) validity of consumer harm as a test; 3 The Design of the Optimal Abuse Tests; (a) The problem; (b) General welfare effects of discrimination; (c) Competitive implications of discrimination on intermediate markets; (d) The market-distorting discrimination test; II Legal Foundations; 4 The Objective of Article 102; (a) The link between the competition rules and the internal market; (b) The internal market and economic freedom; (c) The social welfare objective of the internal market. - (d) The competition rules and the objectives of the Union(a) A methodological gloss; (b) The Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community; (c) From the ECSC Treaty to the Spaak Report; (d) The drafting of the text of Article 102; (e) Long-term social welfare in the; (2) The EU competition rules and the objectives of the Treaties; (a) Article 102; (b) Article 101; (c) Merger control; (a) Fairness and equally efficient competitors; (b) Fairness and less efficient competitors; 5 The General Framework of the Abuse Tests in EU Law; (a) Input/output and complementary products. - Article 102 TFEU prohibits the abuse of a dominant position as incompatible with the internal market. Its application in practice has been controversial with goals as diverse as the preservation of an undistorted competitive process, the protection of economic freedom, the maximisation of consumer welfare, social welfare, or economic efficiency all cited as possible or desirable objectives. These conflicting aims have raised complex questions as to how abuses can be assessed and howa dominant position should be defined.This book addresses the conceptual problems underlying the tests to be appl
|
| Emner | |
| Sjanger | |
| Dewey | |
| ISBN | 9780199226153
|
