Central Bank Independence, Accountability, and Transparency--A Global Perspective
Bernard. Laurens
Bok Engelsk 2009 · Electronic books.
| Annen tittel | |
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| Utgitt | Washington : : International Monetary Fund, , 2009.
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| Omfang | 1 online resource (385 p.)
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| Opplysninger | Description based upon print version of record.. - Cover Page; Title Page; Copyright Page; Contents; Appendices:; Appendices:; List of Figures; List of Tables; List of Tables; List of Figures; Notes on the Contributors; Foreword; Preface; Acknowledgements; Introduction; 1 Survey of Models and Indicators of Independence; Introduction; Base indicators of independence; First indicator of de jure independence: Bade and Parkin (1977); 1.1 Bade and Parkin ranking; Alesina's political response (1988, 1989); 1.2 Results of Alesina, and Bade and Parkin; 1.3 Alesina: inflation, central bank independence, and government spending (1973-1985). - 1.14 Mangano: partial correlations among rankings1.15 Eijffinger, Van Rooij, and Schaling: empirical index and legal indicators; Causality of hypotheses on central bank independence; Robustness and sensitivity of results, and search for new measures; Independence, credibility, and costs of deflation; 1.16 Preliminary questions in Blinder questionnaire; 1.17 Blinder: reasons why credibility is deemed important; 1.18 Blinder: how to create and maintain credibility; Conclusions; I. Variables in Cukierman's LVAU-LVAW indices; II. Variables in Cukierman's QVAU-QVAW. - 1.4 Alesina: average inflation rates in selected periodsGrilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991); 1.5 GMT: political independence index; 1.6 GMT: economic independence index; 1.1 GMT: dispersion of independence; Two of the most widely used indicators:Cukierman (1992); Aggregation of two legal measures: Alesina and Summers (1993); 1.7 Alesina and Summers independence index; A new legal indicator: Eijffinger and Schaling (1993); 1.8 Eijffinger and Schaling policy types; Political vulnerability of central banks: Cukierman and Webb (1995). - 1.9 Cukierman and Webb: frequency of changes in head of central bank1.10 Cukierman and Webb: central bank political vulnerability; 1.11 Cukierman and Webb: correlation between various independence indicators; 1.12 Cukierman and Webb: political vulnerability within six months of transition; Subsequent literature and empirical studies on base indicators; Theoretical and empirical clarifications on central bank independence; Endogenizing the inflation bias; Robustness of independence measures; 1.13 Mangano: comparison of independence indices rankings. - III. Summary of base indicators of de jure independenceIV. Summary of base indicators of de facto independence; V. Summary of empirical studies on de jure independence; VI. Summary of empirical studies on de facto independence; 2 Survey of Models and Indicators of Accountability; Responsibility and accountability; Responsibility; Accountability; The concept of accountability in the literature; 2.1 Accountability in the empirical literature; Briault, Haldane, and King (1996): de jure and de facto accountability; Bini-Smaghi and Gros (2000): ex ante and ex post accountability. - de Haan, Amtenbrink, and Eijffinger (1998): three main features. - In the context of the current global financial crisis, where central banks have taken a key role in preserving systemic stability, this book brings together the three pillars of central bank governance and provides a joint analysis of central bank independence, accountability and transparency. It offers a comprehensive review of the literature, and proposes new indices and calculates new measures of the three pillars of central bank governance, which are afterwards applied to global central banks. This timely volume argues that, while it may not always be desirable for the central bank to supe
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| Emner | |
| Sjanger | |
| Dewey | |
| ISBN | 9780230201071
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